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TSRT-06-07: eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer Monitoring Agent Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
August 8th, 2006 CVE ID: Affected Vendor: Affected Products: Enterprise Security Analyzer TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability since July 31, 2006 by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 4386. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:
These vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code
on vulnerable installations of eIQnetworks Enterprise Security
Analyzer. Authentication is not required to exploit these
vulnerabilities.
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Usage:
QUERYMONITOR: to fetch events for a particular monitor
QUERYMONITOR&<user>&<monid>&timer
QUERYEVENTCOUNT or QEC: to get latest event counts
RESETEVENTCOUNT or REC: to reset event counts
REC&[ALL] or REC&dev1,dev2,
STATUS: Display the running status of all the threads
TRACE: TRACE&ip or hostname&. TRACE&OFF& will turn off the trace
FLUSH: reset monitors as though the hour has changed
ALRT-OFF and ALRT-ON: toggle the life of alerts-thread.
RECV-OFF and RECV-ON: toggle the life of event-collection thread.
EM-OFF and EM-ON toggle event manager
DMON-OFF and DMON-ON toggle device event monitoring
HMON-OFF and HMON-ON toggle host event monitoring
NFMON-OFF and NFMON-ON toggle netflow event monitoring
HPMON-OFF and HPMON-ON toggle host perf monitoring
X or EXIT: to close the session
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Supplying a long string to the TRACE command results in an overflow of the global variable at 0x004B1788. A neighboring global variable, 116 bytes after the overflowed variable, contains a file output stream pointer that is written to every 30 seconds by a garbage collection thread. The log message can be influenced and therefore this is a valid exploit vector, albeit complicated. A trivial exploit vector exists within the parsing of the actual command at the following equivalent API call:
sscanf(socket_data, "%[^&]&%[^&]&", 60_byte_stack_var, global_var);
Because no explicit check is made for the exact command "TRACE", an
attacker can abuse this call to sscanf by passing a long suffix to the
TRACE command that is free of the field terminating character, '&'.
This vector is trivial to exploit.
eIQnetworks has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at:
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Pedram Amini, TippingPoint Security Research Team.
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